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________________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 This appeal concerns the application of our recent 
decision in JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s 
Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010), establishing a new test for 
determining when a “claim” exists under the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.  Plaintiffs Patricia Wright 
and Kevin West (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed a putative 
class action seeking damages related to defects in roofing 
shingles manufactured by Owens Corning.
1
  The District 
Court granted Owens Corning‟s motion for summary 
judgment, determining that the Plaintiffs‟ claims were 
discharged under the confirmed reorganization plan (the 
“Plan”) of Owens Corning and certain of its subsidiaries 
(collectively, the “Debtors”).  Specifically, the Court held 
that, based on Grossman’s, the Plaintiffs held “claims” under 
the Code, and that the published notices of the Debtors‟ 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases afforded them procedural due 
process.  We agree that the Plaintiffs held claims under the 
Code, but, under the circumstances before us, disagree that 
they were afforded procedural due process.  Hence their 
claims were not discharged.  We thus affirm in part and 
reverse in part the Court‟s judgment, and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
                                              
1
 The Plaintiffs incorrectly named Owens Corning as the 
defendant rather than Owens Corning Sales LLC.  
Nonetheless, we continue to refer to the defendant as “Owens 
Corning.”            
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I. Background 
The Plaintiffs‟ story presents the challenge of 
administering unknown future claims in bankruptcy.  In late 
1998 or early 1999, Wright hired a contractor, who installed 
shingles manufactured by Owens Corning on her roof.  In 
2005, West similarly hired a contractor, who likewise 
installed shingles manufactured by Owens Corning on his 
roof.  They both discovered leaks in 2009, and determined 
that the shingles had cracked.  Each sent warranty claims to 
Owens Corning.  It rejected Wright‟s claim in part and West‟s 
claim in full.  In November 2009, Wright filed a class action 
against Owens Corning alleging fraud, negligence, strict 
liability, and breach of warranty.  West later was added as a 
named plaintiff. 
Meanwhile, back in October 2000, the Debtors filed 
their Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions.  In November 2001, 
the Bankruptcy Court set a claims bar date of April 15, 2002.  
All claimants were required to file proofs of claim on or 
before that date.  It also approved a bar date notice, which 
was published twice in The New York Times, The Wall 
Street Journal, and USA Today, among other publications.  
The notice directed claimants to file proofs of claim if they 
held claims
2
 that arose prior to the filing of the Debtors‟ 
bankruptcy cases.  It specifically identified claims relating to 
“the sale, manufacture, distribution, installation and/or 
marketing of products by any of the Debtors, including 
without limitation . . . roofing shingles . . . .”   
                                              
2
 The notice defined “claim” as it is defined in the Bankruptcy 
Code: “[a] right to payment, whether or not such right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .”  11 U.S.C § 101(5).   
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The Debtors‟ bankruptcy proceedings resulted in the 
filing of the Plan in June 2006.  Soon after, the Bankruptcy 
Court approved notices of the confirmation hearing for the 
Plan, including a generic notice to most unknown claimants.
3
  
This notice was published in The New York Times, The Wall 
Street Journal, and USA Today, among other publications.  It 
stated, in bold, that the Plan might affect the rights of holders 
of claims against the Debtors.   
Two other notices of the Debtors‟ bankruptcy 
proceedings also were published.  In June 2006, notice of the 
hearing to consider the disclosure statement was published in 
The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, 
and the Toledo Blade.  In November 2006, notice of the 
Plan‟s date of confirmation, September 26, 2006 (the 
“Confirmation Date”), was published in the same four 
publications.  The Plan provided for the discharge of all 
claims relating to the Debtors under the Bankruptcy Code that 
                                              
3
 For notice purposes, claimants are divided into “known” and 
“unknown.”  A “known” claimant (or creditor) “is one whose 
identity is either known „or reasonably ascertainable by the 
debtor.‟”  Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (quoting Tulsa Prof’l Collection Serv., Inc. v. 
Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988)).  In contrast, “[a]n 
„unknown‟ creditor is one whose „interests are either 
conjectural or future or, although they could be discovered 
upon investigation, do not in due course of business come to 
knowledge [of the debtor].‟”  Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)) (second 
alteration in original).  On appeal, the parties do not contest 
that the Plaintiffs were unknown claimants.      
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arose before the Confirmation Date.
4
  The order confirming 
the Plan (the “Confirmation Order”) likewise provided that all 
claims arising before the Confirmation Date were discharged.   
When the Plaintiffs filed their class action, there was 
little dispute as to the effect of Owens Corning‟s bankruptcy 
on the Plaintiffs‟ claims against it.  Based on our much-
maligned decision in Avellino v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. 
Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), a “claim” under 
the Bankruptcy Code did not arise until a cause of action 
accrued under applicable non-bankruptcy law—that is, when 
a claimant possessed a right to payment.  In this context, the 
Plaintiffs‟ cause of action did not accrue until the defects in 
the roofing shingles manifested in 2009, years after the 
Confirmation Date.
5
  Thus, at the time they filed the class 
action, the Plaintiffs were correct to conclude that they did 
not hold “claims” under the Code based on the action.  But 
subsequently we overruled Frenville with our en banc 
                                              
4
 Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that 
“confirmation of a plan . . . discharges the debtor from any 
debt that arose before the date of such confirmation, . . . 
whether or not (i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is 
filed . . . ; (ii) such claim is allowed . . . ; or (iii) the holder of 
such claim has accepted the plan.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1141(d)(1)(A).  “Debt” is defined as liability on a claim.  Id. 
§ 101(12). 
5
 This assumes that the applicable law comes from either 
Illinois or Pennsylvania, the states where the Plaintiffs reside.  
Under either‟s law, as with most states‟ laws, a right to 
payment does not accrue until a product defect is evident and 
an individual suffers actual damages.  See Hermitage Corp. v. 
Contractors Adjustment Co., 651 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ill. 
1995); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415 A.2d 80, 83 (Pa. 1980). 
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decision in Grossman’s, in which we rejected Frenville‟s 
“accrual test,” and in its place established the rule that a 
“„claim‟ arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a 
product or other conduct giving rise to an injury, which 
underlies a „right to payment‟ under the Bankruptcy Code.”  
607 F.3d at 125.   
Based on Grossman’s, Owens Corning filed its motion 
for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiffs‟ claims 
were discharged under the Plan and Confirmation Order.  
Before the District Court, the Plaintiffs argued that 
Grossman’s is limited to asbestos-related cases, it does not 
apply retroactively, and they were not afforded due process 
because the notices of the bankruptcy proceedings were 
insufficient.  The Court rejected these arguments, holding that 
the Plaintiffs‟ claims were discharged under the Plan and 
Confirmation Order.  
On appeal, the Plaintiffs advance two arguments.  
First, they argue that the District Court applied Grossman’s 
too rigidly, creating the unworkable result that persons who 
did not anticipate future tort actions at the time of a 
bankruptcy proceeding nonetheless possess claims under the 
Bankruptcy Code that are discharged.  The test set out in 
Grossman’s, they assert, requires that the debtor and claimant 
anticipate a future tort action at the time of the bankruptcy 
proceedings for a claim to exist.  Second, they claim that the 
District Court‟s due process analysis fell short because it 
based its ruling on our precedent holding that unknown 
claimants generally are entitled to notification by publication. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§1332(a) and (d)(2).  We have jurisdiction to review the 
Court‟s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a 
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district court‟s grant of summary judgment de novo.  MBIA 
Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate when “the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).  “All reasonable 
inferences from the record must be drawn in favor of the 
nonmoving party,” and we “may not weigh the evidence or 
assess credibility.”  MBIA Ins., 426 F.3d at 209.  For there to 
be a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party 
must produce evidence “such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for” it.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
III. Grossman’s and “Claims” under the Bankruptcy 
Code 
A. Waiver 
In addressing whether the Plaintiffs held claims under 
the Bankruptcy Code, we first confront the effect of their 
failure to advance to the District Court their argument on 
appeal regarding Grossman’s.  Before the District Court, the 
Plaintiffs contended only that Grossman’s is limited to 
asbestos-related claims and should not apply retroactively.  
They advance neither argument to us.  We generally follow “a 
well established principle that it is inappropriate for an 
appellate court to consider a contention raised on appeal that 
was not initially presented to the district court.”  Lloyd v. 
Hovensa, 369 F.3d 263, 27273 (3d Cir. 2004).  Yet this 
principle “is one of discretion rather than jurisdiction,” 
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 
1983), and we may consider an argument raised for the first 
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time on appeal in “exceptional circumstances,” such as the 
when the “public interest . . . so warrants.”  Barefoot 
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 83435 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 620 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1977)); see also Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 
(3d Cir. 2011) (noting that “„the matter of what questions may 
be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one 
left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be 
exercised on the facts of individual cases‟” (quoting Council 
of Alter. Pol. Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 
1999)).  The principle also is best applied to issues that are 
fact-dependent or the resolution of which on a basis not 
argued to the district court will surprise the parties.  Barefoot 
Architect, 632 F.3d at 835.  
We believe that the “public interest” weighs heavily 
toward our consideration of whether the Plaintiffs held claims 
under the Bankruptcy Code.  What constitutes a claim has the 
potential to affect a wide range of proceedings, the issue is 
purely legal, the scope of Grossman’s is generally at issue in 
this case, and addressing whether the Plaintiffs held claims 
will clarify the test we established in Grossman’s.  This is an 
appropriate situation for us to exercise our discretion. 
B. “Claims” Under the Bankruptcy Code 
Consideration of the treatment of unknown future 
claims involves two competing concerns: the Bankruptcy 
Code‟s goal of providing a debtor with a fresh start by 
resolving all claims arising from the debtor‟s conduct prior to 
its emergence from bankruptcy; and the rights of individuals 
who may be damaged by that conduct but are unaware of the 
potential harm at the time of the debtor‟s bankruptcy.  In 
overruling Frenville‟s “accrual test,” we recognized that it 
had been “universally rejected” based on its conflict with the 
Code‟s broad definition of the term “claim.”  Grossman’s, 
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607 F.3d at 12021 (quoting Cadleway Props., Inc. v. 
Andrews (In re Andrews), 239 F.3d 708, 710 n.7 (5th Cir. 
2001)).  To repeat, in its place we adopted the rule that a 
“„claim‟ arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a 
product or other conduct giving rise to an injury, which 
underlies a „right to payment‟ under the Bankruptcy Code.”  
Id. at 125.  This rule reflects the Code‟s expansive treatment 
of claims even if, as we acknowledged, that treatment is to the 
“disadvantage [of] potential claimants, such as tort claimants, 
whose injuries were allegedly caused by the debtor but which 
have not yet manifested and who therefore had no reason to 
file claims in the bankruptcy.”  Id. at 122.      
The rule is an amalgam of the two tests that other 
Courts of Appeals generally follow—the conduct test and the 
pre-petition relationship test.  Under the former, a claim arises 
“when the acts giving rise to [the] liability were performed, 
not when the harm caused by those acts was manifested.”  Id.  
See Watson v. Parker (In re Parker), 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 
2002); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 
1988).  Under the pre-petition relationship test, “a claim 
arises from a debtor‟s pre-petition tortious conduct where 
there is also some pre-petition relationship between the debtor 
and the claimant, such as a purchase, use, operation of, or 
exposure to the debtor‟s product.”  Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 
123.  See Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors 
(In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir. 
1995); Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268 (5th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay 
Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).  Cf. ZiLOG, Inc. v. 
Corning (In re ZiLOG, Inc.), 450 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(adopting a “fair contemplation” test, which is similar to the 
pre-petition relationship test).  Drawing on the tests‟ 
similarities, we noted that in the typical case “there seems to 
be something approaching a consensus among the courts that 
a prerequisite for recognizing a „claim‟ is that the claimant‟s 
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exposure to a product giving rise to the „claim‟ occurred pre-
petition, even though the injury manifested after the 
reorganization.”  Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 125.  Consistent 
with that consensus, the Grossman’s test requires that a 
claimant be exposed to a debtor‟s product or conduct pre-
petition.  It requires individuals to recognize that, by being 
exposed to a debtor‟s product or conduct, they might hold 
claims even if no damage is then evident.     
As applied to the Plaintiffs, we easily conclude that 
Wright held a claim.  She purchased shingles manufactured 
by Owens Corning in late 1998 or early 1999.  Her exposure 
to Owens Corning‟s products predated its bankruptcy 
petition.  We applied the test announced in Grossman’s 
retroactively to the claimants in that case.  Id.; see also In re 
Rodriguez, 629 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2010) (retroactively 
applying Grossman’s to Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings 
begun in 2007).  We thus apply the Grossman’s test 
retroactively to Wright to conclude that she held a claim.   
Whether West held a claim is less obvious.  He 
purchased his shingles in 2005, after Owens Corning filed its 
bankruptcy petition but before the Plan was confirmed.  In 
Grossman’s, we were not confronted with post-petition, pre-
confirmation exposure, and thus based our test on pre-petition 
exposure.  We, however, noted that the Eleventh Circuit 
Court has extended the pre-petition relationship test to post-
petition, pre-confirmation relationships.  Grossman’s, 607 
F.3d at 124 (citing In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577).  It reasoned 
that “changing the focal point of the relationship from the 
petition date to the confirmation date” would be more 
consistent with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code, 
including its broad definition of the term “claim” to afford 
debtors a fresh start.  In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 157758 n.5.  
Indeed, the Code provides that confirmation of a plan 
“discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the 
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date of such confirmation.”  11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) 
(emphasis added).  See also id. § 348(d) (providing, in the 
context of conversion from a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 
proceeding to a Chapter 7 proceeding, that claims other than 
priority claims arising after the petition date, but before 
conversion, are treated as pre-petition claims in the Chapter 7 
proceeding); id. § 502(e) (providing that “a claim for 
reimbursement or contribution . . . that becomes fixed after 
the commencement of a case” is a pre-petition claim for 
purposes of allowance).    
Not extending our test to post-petition, but pre-
confirmation, exposure would unnecessarily restrict the 
Bankruptcy Code‟s expansive treatment of “claims” that we 
recognized in Grossman’s.  It also would separate artificially 
individuals who are affected by a debtor‟s products or 
conduct pre-petition from those who are affected after the 
debtor‟s filing of its bankruptcy petition but before 
confirmation of a plan.  We thus restate the test announced in 
Grossman’s to include such exposure and hold that a claim 
arises when an individual is exposed pre-confirmation to a 
product or other conduct giving rise to an injury that underlies 
a “right to payment” under the Code.  As West‟s exposure to 
Owens Corning‟s shingles occurred pre-confirmation, he also 
held a claim. 
IV. Due Process 
Though the Plaintiffs held claims under the 
Bankruptcy Code, those claims may not have been discharged 
by the Plan and Confirmation Order.  Discharge of the claims 
of future unknown claimants raises questions regarding due 
process.
6
  Notice is “[a]n elementary and fundamental 
                                              
6
 Having determined that the Plaintiffs held “claims” under 
the Code based on Grossman’s, the District Court first held 
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requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality . . . .”  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).  Lack or inadequacy of 
notice of a bankruptcy prevents a claimant from having the 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a bankruptcy 
proceeding to protect his or her claim.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 342(a) (“There shall be given such notice as is appropriate . 
. . of an order for relief . . . under [the Bankruptcy Code].”).  
Inadequate notice accordingly “precludes discharge of a claim 
in bankruptcy.”  Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
As the District Court noted, we generally hold that for 
unknown claimants, like the Plaintiffs, notice by publication 
in national newspapers is sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of due process, particularly if it is supplemented 
by notice in local papers.  Id. at 34849.  But whether 
                                                                                                     
that the claims were discharged pursuant to the Confirmation 
Order before considering whether the notices afforded the 
Plaintiffs due process, a concept rooted in fairness and 
applicable to bankruptcy through the Fifth Amendment of our 
Constitution.  See SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In 
re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).  
However, if a claimant is not afforded due process, a plan of 
reorganization and confirmation order that purport to 
discharge claims will not do so.  See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 
127 (“A court therefore must decide whether discharge of the  
. . . claims would comport with due process, which may invite 
inquiry into the adequacy of the notice . . . .”); Jones v. 
Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]f a 
potential claimant lacks sufficient notice of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, due process considerations dictate that his or her 
claim cannot be discharged by a confirmation order.”).   
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adequate notice has been provided depends on the 
circumstances of a particular case.  Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 
127.  Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also 
SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Mansaray-
Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 239 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The level of 
process due to a party prior to the deprivation of a property 
interest . . . is highly dependent on the context.  As the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, „[t]he very nature 
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures 
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.‟” 
(quoting Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 
196 (2001)) (alteration in original)).   
Though the Debtors‟ notices were sufficient as to most 
unknown claimants, the Plaintiffs‟ situation differed 
significantly from that of the typical unknown claimant.  At 
the time the Plaintiffs received their notices, Frenville was the 
law in our Circuit (though we refrain from saying “good” 
law).  As noted, under the Frenville test the Plaintiffs did not 
hold “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code.  On reading the 
notices, the Plaintiffs could only understand that their rights 
would not be affected in any way by the referenced 
proceedings, and thus, correctly, would not have taken any 
action to ensure that their interests were represented.  Not 
until we overturned Frenville and established our new test for 
determining when a claim exists under the Code did the 
Plaintiffs unexpectedly hold “claims” that arguably could be 
discharged in the proceedings addressed in the notices.  By 
that time, however, the bar date had passed, the Confirmation 
Order had been entered, and the Confirmation Date had 
occurred, each of which affected the Plaintiffs‟ newfound 
claim status without an opportunity for them to be heard.  
Due process affords a re-do in these special situations to be 
16 
 
sure all claimants have equal rights.  We thus hold that, for 
persons who have “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code based 
solely on the retroactive effect of the rule announced in 
Grossman’s, those claims are not discharged when the notice 
given to those persons was with the understanding that they 
did not hold claims.
7
   
                                              
7
 Given our reliance on the exceptional circumstances created 
by the retroactive application of Grossman’s, we express no 
opinion on the broader issue of whether discharging unknown 
future claims comports with due process.  See generally 
Laura B. Bartell, Due Process for the Unknown Future Claim 
in Bankruptcy—Is This Notice Really Necessary?, 78 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 339 (2004).  In this vein and consistent with our 
statements that whether due process has been provided 
depends on the circumstances of a particular case, our holding 
is not a bright-line rule that all persons with unknown future 
claims once governed by Frenville could not have been 
provided due process regardless of the adequacy of notice to 
those future claimants.   
For example, in some bankruptcy proceedings a future claims 
representative is appointed to represent and protect the 
interests of persons with future unknown claims.  These 
representatives are appointed, in part, to address the broader 
issue of whether discharging unknown future claims comports 
with due process.  See, e.g., id. at 340.  Indeed, future claims 
representatives have been appointed by courts 
notwithstanding their conclusion that those unknown persons 
did not hold “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code.  See, e.g., 
New Nat’l Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. Settlement Trust 
(In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 219 F.3d 478, 48081 (5th Cir. 
2000); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1043 (3d Cir. 
17 
 
Because we now explicitly extend the Grossman’s test 
to include post-petition, pre-confirmation exposure to a 
debtor‟s conduct or product, there are two groups of persons 
holding “claims” based on the Grossman’s test who, at the 
time they were given notice of a bankruptcy proceeding, 
would understand that they did not hold claims.  The first 
group comprises those who hold claims based on Grossman’s 
rejection of the Frenville test—that is, persons exposed to a 
debtor‟s conduct or product pre-petition.  As to these persons, 
due process calls for the outcome of the Frenville test to 
apply for bankruptcy cases in which reorganization plans are 
proposed and confirmed prior to June 2, 2010, when 
Grossman’s was decided.  After that date, persons exposed to 
a debtor‟s conduct or product pre-petition are deemed to 
understand that they held claims.   
In contrast, because the Grossman’s test is limited to 
pre-petition exposure, persons exposed to a debtor‟s conduct 
                                                                                                     
1985).  Because a future claims representative was not 
appointed in these bankruptcy cases, we leave open whether, 
when such a representative provides persons with unknown 
future claims an opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy 
case through that representation, they are afforded due 
process through otherwise adequate notice to the future 
claims representative.  See, e.g., Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 
212 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]f a potential claimant 
lacks sufficient notice of a bankruptcy proceeding, due 
process considerations dictate that his or her claim cannot be 
discharged by a confirmation order.  Such due process 
considerations are often addressed by the appointment of a 
representative to receive notice for and represent the interests 
of a group of unknown creditors.” (internal citations 
omitted)).    
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or product post-petition, but pre-confirmation, would 
continue to conclude that they did not hold claims.  Hence the 
second group is comprised of persons who hold claims based 
on our decision today extending the Grossman’s test.  Due 
process requires that the outcome of the Frenville test will 
continue to apply to their claims in bankruptcy cases where 
reorganization plans are proposed and confirmed prior to the 
date of today‟s decision.   
*    *    *    *    * 
Because at the time of the Confirmation Date Frenville 
controlled the status of their “claims,” the Plaintiffs were not 
afforded due process.  Accordingly their claims were not 
discharged by the Plan and Confirmation Order, and they 
retained their cause of action against Owens Corning.  In this 
context, the District Court correctly determined that the 
Plaintiffs held “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code.  But it 
should not have held that those claims were discharged, and 
thereby granted summary judgment to Owens Corning, in the 
circumstances before us.  We thus affirm in part and reverse 
in part the District Court‟s judgment, and remand the case to 
that Court for further proceedings.  The shadow of Frenville 
fades, but more slowly than we would like.       
